THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

18 February 1982

NOTE FOR: C/NIC

FROM : MG Edward B. Atkeson, USA

NIO/GPF

SUBJECT: CIA/DIA Soviet Readiness Briefing

Harry:

You asked me to look at the Soviet ground force readiness briefing. Attached is a first blush reaction—not very enthusiastic as you can see. I have asked the analysts involved to come over for a more thorough exploration of the matter, and will give you another report after that.

Let me call your attention to a point in paragraph 6. The simple static force comparisons we normally use for our estimates can sometimes mislead us as to real force capability differences. Unfortunately, we do not have (or do not use) dynamic gaming or simulations to determine how or when, in a given scenario, the Soviets might employ their forces. Whether a larger or smaller force is available at a given point in time may not mean much if the smaller force is adequate, or is all that can be reasonably employed, at that time. Eventually, I think we will have to get into gaming.

Edward B. Atkeson

Attachment

